TTDOTATT 686

Airline Loyalty Revenue Is Visible; Profit Is Still Unproven

Delta booked $8.2 billion from American Express in 2025 and American collected $6.2 billion from partners, yet filings do not show what bank-funded loyalty programs earn after redemption costs.

The Multi-Billion-Dollar Loyalty Mirage: Why We Still Don’t Know What Airline Cards Really Earn
The Multi-Billion-Dollar Loyalty Mirage: Why We Still Don’t Know What Airline Cards Really EarnTheDigitalWay / pixabay

Itinerary

  1. United recorded 10.9 million flight awards in 2025, while Scott Kirby said more than 50,000 passengers fly daily on credit-card miles.
  2. Delta reported $8.2 billion from American Express in 2025, up 11%.
  3. American collected $6.2 billion from credit-card and other partners.
  4. United reported $2.7 billion in loyalty marketing and partner-benefit revenue for the first nine months of 2026 and $7.8 billion in deferred loyalty revenue at the end of 2025.
  5. A June 2020 MileagePlus example used $300 for 15,000 miles and a 50% internal-transfer margin, not the passenger-carrying cost.

United Airlines counted 10.9 million flight awards in 2025, but CEO Scott Kirby says more than 50,000 passengers fly each day on credit-card miles—implying more than 18 million a year, a gap the airline has not publicly reconciled with its filings.

Delta Air Lines reported $8.2 billion from American Express in 2025, up 11%, and American Airlines collected $6.2 billion from credit-card and other partners. Those figures establish the scale of loyalty cash, but the filings do not show what the bank deals earn after the cost of carrying redeemers.

United CEO Scott Kirby rejects the shorthand that airlines are credit card companies with planes attached. In an October 27 interview on The Cheeky Pint podcast, he said: “Nobody counts the cost.” He added: “All that we disclose is the revenue.”

Kirby’s criticism targets analysts who count the cash banks pay for miles but omit the expense of carrying the passengers who redeem them. Skift previously examined the payment fees that fund travel rewards; this analysis follows the other side of the trade.

How much loyalty cash do the filings show?

The disclosure remains uneven. United does not publish total cash received from banks. For the first nine months of 2026, it reported $2.7 billion in loyalty marketing and partner-benefit revenue, up from $2.4 billion, and ended 2025 with about $7.8 billion in deferred loyalty revenue.

During the pandemic, United, Delta and American showed lenders how much cash their loyalty programs could produce. American has since told investors what a bigger bank deal could add to earnings. These disclosures show the scale of partner cash, not the net profit on bank agreements.

In short, the filings show how much cash arrives, but not how much the airlines keep.

What does United’s $300 example prove?

United’s June 2020 MileagePlus presentation showed a bank paying $300 for 15,000 miles. MileagePlus then paid United’s airline unit $150 for a redeemed seat and recorded a 50% margin.

United used that $150 as an internal transfer price between two units of the same parent, not as the cost of flying the passenger. The example cannot establish what United earned from the bank or from the completed award transaction.

A 50% internal-transfer margin is not evidence of a 50% profit on the bank’s mileage purchase.

How much award travel sits behind the revenue?

United’s filing shows award use rising from 6.1 million flight awards in 2019, equal to 7.2% of passenger miles, to 10.9 million awards in 2025, or 10.3%. Both volume and share increased.

Kirby’s figure of more than 50,000 passengers a day using credit-card miles implies more than 18 million passengers a year. That exceeds the 10.9 million flight awards recorded for 2025, and United has not publicly reconciled the difference. The daily figure and the filing-based award count do not match.

The gap matters because more award travel can increase the distribution value of bank-funded miles while also raising the cost of filling award seats. The available filings offer no reconciled bridge between the two measures, so sellers of travel cannot treat 50,000 daily passengers as proof of a larger or more profitable award program.

United shows more award use, but has not connected that volume to a verified earnings contribution.

What can travel sellers and investors conclude?

Measured results include Delta’s 2025 American Express revenue, American’s partner collections, United’s nine-month loyalty marketing revenue and deferred balance, and United’s annual award counts. These figures show the scale and direction of the loyalty businesses.

Other claims remain less conclusive. The 50% margin came from an internal transfer in a June 2020 presentation; the 50,000 daily passenger figure is Kirby’s claim and remains unreconciled; and American has framed the earnings contribution of a bigger bank deal as a future possibility. None isolates the profit earned from bank agreements.

For airlines selling seats to award customers, bank-funded miles supply a distribution channel whose scale is visible in Delta’s 11% American Express revenue growth and United’s 10.3% award share. The filings do not disclose enough to compare margins across the three programs, calculate reliable profit per award seat, or judge which partnership creates the most value.

The practical trading conclusion is simple: revenue growth is visible, but bank-partnership profitability remains an unanswered question.

via Skift (Source)

Share this article:

More from Tom Whitfield

Tom Whitfield

Show full bio

Staff writer covering technology and product news in Tourism industry coverage for trade professionals at Travel Trade Desk.

573 articles

Also boarding · Related articles

« Previous flight